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Shortly after the adoption of the Constitution, the South came to see
the power granted to Congress to regulate commerce as a major threat
to its domestic tranquility, for this power extended, or might reason-
ably be seen to extend, to the regulation of the slave trade, domestic
as well as foreign. The question of the extent of federal power over
commerce was, in the minds of Southerners, simply coincident with the
question of the extent of federal power over slavery.' As Charles War-
ren puts it,
the long-continued controversy as to whether Congress had exclu-
sive or concurrent jurisdiction over commerce was not a conflict
between theories of government, or between Nationalism and
State-Rights, or between differing legal construction of the Con-
stitution, but was simply the naked issue of State or Federal con-
trol of slavery. 2
The friends of slavery had every reason to feel threatened by the
commerce power. They had exacted a compromise at Philadelphia in
1787, according to which Congress was forbidden to abolish the slave
trade for twenty years. But twenty years is not a long time in the af-
fairs of nations-or institutions-and the day would inevitably come
when Congress might exercise its power, with incalculable effect on
the institution of slavery itself. Hence the very men who insisted on
the right to buy and sell other men as articles of commerce denied that
these other men were articles of commerce for purposes of the Consti-
tution's commerce clause. In addition, to make doubly certain that
Congress's power to regulate commerce would not threaten the exist-
ence of their "peculiar institution," Madison and others fostered what
has become the traditional interpretation of the first clause of Article
I, Section 9, denying all congressional power to regulate the internal
slave trade, and leaving only importation from Africa to be prohibited
after 1808.3
The clause in question reads as follows:
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3. That James Madison lent his authoritative voice to this interpretation may account
for Joseph Story's adoption of the Southern reading of the clause in his influential
Commentaries on the Constitution. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
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The migration or Importation of Such Persons as any of the States
now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited
by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and
eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not
exceeding ten dollars for each Person.
The controversy over the scope of this proscription centered about a
dispute over the meaning of the phrase "such persons." If "such per-
sons" referred exclusively to slaves, then Congress was limited in two
respects by the clause: it could not before 1808 forbid the importation
of slaves from abroad into the states originally existing and, secondly,
could not until 1808 legislate so as to prevent the migration of slaves-
that is, the movement of slaves-between or among the states originally
existing, despite its expressly granted power over commerce among the
states.
Such an interpretation could not be accepted by the South. If the
clause were read as including a limitation on an underlying congres-
sional power to regulate the movement of slaves between states, the
removal of that limitation in 1808 would leave Congress free to stop
not only the importation of slaves from abroad but all interstate traffic
in them as well. The Southern response to this danger was to insist
that the phrase "such persons" referred not to slaves alone, but to both
slaves, who are "imported," and to white aliens, who "migrate," into
the United States. Such a reading, by leaving no internal operation to
the term "migration," restricted the limitation of the clause-and
hence, by implication, the scope of the congressional power being
limited-to entries into the United States from abroad. The question,
and a great deal turned on the answer, is whether this Southern inter-
pretation is a fair construction of the clause.
4
I.
The clause made its first appearance in the Constitutional Conven-
tion on August 6, in the Report of the Committee of Detail. At that
= UNrrED STATES § 223 (1847). Chancellor Kent's Commentaries on American Law
had earlier taken the same position. 1 J. KI'NT, Co.BrmENTMS O AM EFiUC Lmw 19 n.(1830).
4. Although the clause was discussed in dicta in a handful of cases. the Supreme
Court was never called upon to interpret it directly. Marshall mentioned the dause
in his opinion for the Court in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 216-17 (1824).
where he accepted the Southern version of it; Taney, on the other hand, used it in
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 411 (1857), to argue that "neither the
description of persons therein referred to, nor their descendants," were embraced within
the terms "citizens" or "the people of the United States." He thus assumed that tle
term "such persons" referred only to Negro slaves; either that or his argument would
also exclude white immigrants from citizenshipl
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time it read as follows: "No tax or duty shall be laid by the Legisla-
ture on articles exported from any State; nor on the migration or im-
portation of such persons as the several states shall think proper to
admit; nor shall such migration or importation be prohibited."IS In this
form the clause provoked an acrimonious debate concerning the whole
subject of slavery. The South Carolinians and Georgians insisted that
their states would never join the Union if the importation of slaves
were forbidden; the others denounced "this infernal traffic" and the
"pernicious effect on manners" caused by slavery. The debate was
closed only when Gouverneur Morris proposed that "the whole sub-
ject" along with "the clause relating to taxes on exports k to a naviga-
tion act" be turned over to a committee. "These things," he said, "may
form a bargain among the Northern 8c Southern States."' ;
This was precisely what happened. The Committee of Eleven, com-
posed of one member from each state present, reported on August 24,
recommending the elimination of the clause requiring a two-thirds
majority for all "navigation acts" and the replacement of the absolute
prohibition "of laws forbidding the migration and importation of "such
persons" by a provision forbidding such laws only until 1800.1 The
Southern states would not be able to protect themselves from laws
favoring Northern shippers and discriminating against foreign shippers
by rallying one-third plus one of the members of each house of Con-
gress; nor, since navigation acts were acknowledged by everyone to be
regulations of commerce, would they be able to protect the slave trade
by this provision.8 This was a concession to the Northern states. But
the latter would not, even with a majority in each house, be able to
ban "this infernal traffic" prior to 1800. This was the concession to the
Southern states, specifically to South Carolina and Georgia who, alone
at the time, insisted on importing further slaves. On the motion of
General Pinckney, and over the objection of James Madison, who pro-
tested that "twenty years will produce all the mischief that can be ap.
5. 2 M. FARRAND, THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 183 (rev. ed.
1937) [hereinafter cited as FARRAND].
6. Id. 874.
7. Id. 396, 408.
8. This aspect of the bargain was explained succinctly to Jefferson by George Mason
in 1792. He could have agreed to the Constitution, he said, if various changes had not
been made during the last two weeks of the convention. One of the changes to which
he objected was the deletion of the two-thirds provision. Georgia and South Carolina,
he then explained, knew that, with the power to regulate commerce, Congress, unless
restrained in the Constitution, "would immediately suppress the importn. of slaves."
They "therefore struck up a bargain with the 3. N. Engld. states, if they would join
to admit slaves for some years, the 2 Southernmost states wd join in changing the
clause which required 2/3 of the legislature in any vote." 3 id. 867.
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prehended from the liberty to import slaves," the prohibition was ex-
tended to 1808, and the compromise adopted by a vote of 7-4.
Thus everyone, Southerner and Northerner, pro-slavery and anti-
slavery, seems to have assumed from the beginning that the traffic in
slaves was commerce and subject to Congress's power to regulate com-
merce. But the commerce power is not limited to foreign trade; on the
contrary, Congress is expressly granted the power to regulate commerce
"among the several states." Why, then, should it not follow that Con-
gress had the power to regulate the domestic slave trade?
Quite apart from the logical extent of the commerce power, those
who foresaw congressional abolition of slavery after 1808 must have
assumed that control over internal commerce in slaves would be the
instrument of that abolition.10 Simple prohibition of importation could
hardly have been expected to bring an end to the "peculiar institu-
tion." From the fragment preserved from the New Hampshire ratify-
ing debate, for example, we learn that an "honorable member from
Portsmouth boasted... 'that an end is then to be put to slavery."' This
led Joshua Atherton to reply not that no such power was granted to
Congress but rather that in 1808 "Congress may be as much, or more,
puzzled to put a stop to it then, than we are now." Thus although the
clause by itself "has not secured its abolition," it empowers Congress, if
it so desires, to legislate toward that end."
Madison, as we shall see, took essentially the same position at the
time of ratification. During the Missouri controversy some years later,
however, he joined his colleagues from the South in insisting that Con-
gress had no authority over the internal slave trade. The language of
the clause, he wrote in 1819 in a letter to Robert Walsh, provided that
"[G]ongress should not interfere until the year 1808; with an implica-
tion, that after that date, they might prohibit the importation of slaves
9. 2 id. 415.
10. At times, however, it was not at all clear just what was being assumed. James
Wilson, speaking in 1787 to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, argued that
. ..by this article, after the year 1808, the Congress will have power to prohibit
such importation, notwithstanding the disposition of any state to the contrary.
I consider this as laying the foundation for banishing slavery out of this country
and in the mean time, the new states which are to be formed will be under
the control of Congress in this particular, and slaves will never be introduced
amongst them.
2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUToN 452 (1836) [hereinafter cited as
ELuor]; 3 FARRAND 161. Wilson may have had nothing more than the commerce power
in mind, but it is possible that he was thinking in terms of an independent power to
prohibit slavery itself. Farrand goes on to quote him as saying that within a ew years
"'Congress will have power to exterminate slavery within our borders." Id. 437.
11. 2 ELLOTT 203.
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into the States then existing, & previous thereto, into the States not
then existing .... 12
But whatever may have been intended by the term "migration"
or the term "persons," it is most certain, that they referred exclu-
sively to a migration or importation from other countries into the
U. States; and not to a removal, voluntary or involuntary, of slaves
or freemen, from one to another part of the United States. 1
Despite Madison's confidence, it is quite certain that the issue of Con.
gress's power over the internal slave trade necessarily turned on the
meaning accorded to the phrase "such persons." As pointed out above,
if the phrase referred exclusively to slaves, Article I, Section 9 implied
a congressional power to regulate the interstate slave trade.
It should be remembered that in its original version Article I, Sec-
tion 9 provoked only a slave trade debate. Nor is there any doubt that
in its amended version the clause was intended as a compromise be-
tween those who, in Madison's own words, wanted "an immediate
and absolute stop to the [slave] trade" and those who "were not only
averse to any interference on the subject," but went further to solemnly
declare "that their constituents would never accede to a constitution
containing such an article." Out of this conflict, Madison concludes,
"grew the middle measure providing that Congress should not inter-
fere until the year 1808 . .. ."14 It would be odd indeed if in such cir-
cumstances the phrase "such persons" had been understood or intended
to include white aliens as well as slaves.
Everyone knew why the term "such persons" was used instead of
"slaves." Luther Martin, in his lengthy address to the Maryland legis-
lature on the proposed constitution, was not speaking for himself alone
when he said that the delegates to the convention "anxiously sought
to avoid the admission of expressions which might be odious in the ears
of Americans . . . -15 Madison, in the letter to Walsh quoted above,
agreed: the convention, he said, "had scruples against admitting the
term 'Slaves' into the Instrument."'u Indeed, there is very little evi-
dence contemporary with the writing and ratification of the Constitu-
tion to suggest that "such persons" was understood as anything more
than a euphemism for "slaves." During the North Carolina debate, for
example, Richard Spaight, who had been a delegate to the convention,




16. Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh, Nov. 27, 1819. 3 FARRAND 436.
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was asked to explain the clause in question. He responded, with no
reference to free aliens, that "the Southern States, whose principal
support depended on the labor of slaves, would not consent to the de-
sire of the Northern States to exclude the importation of slaves abso-
lutely .... ,.17 Similarly Luther Martin, who had been a member of
the Committee of Eleven that had effected the compromise, described
the deliberations over the clause without reference to anything except
the slave trade:
I found the eastern states, notwithstanding their aversion to
slavery, were very willing to indulge the southern states at least
with a temporary liberty to prosecute the slave-trade, provided
the southern states would, in their turn, gratify them, by laying
no restriction on navigation acts .... 18
The only references to free aliens during the ratification debates were
made by Wilson of Pennsylvania and Iredell and Galloway of North
Carolina. Wilson, in response to an objection that the tax provision
would inhibit the "introduction of white people from Europe," pointed
out that the tax might be laid on importation but not on migration,
thus implying that migration referred to persons other than slaves.
10
Iredell made the same point during the North Carolina debates.
20
Against this must be put the testimony of Benjamin Rush, who as-
sumed, and asserted that other anti-slavery men had also assumed, that
after 1808 Congress would possess the authority to abolish slavery itself
-presumably by prohibiting all commerce, both foreign and domestic,
in slaves. Writing to Jeremy Belknap in 1788 he said:
There was a respectable representation of [Quakers] in our [the
Pennsylvania] Convention, all of whom voted in favor of the new
Constitution. They consider very wisely that the abolition of slav-
ery in our country must be gradual in order to be effectual, and
that the section of the Constitution which will put it in the power
of Congress twenty years hence to restrain it altogether was a great
17. Id. 346.
18. Id. 210-11 (emphasis in original).
19. 2 ELuOT 452-53. In the same speech, however, Wilson also expressed the view
that after 1808 "Congress will have power to exterminate slavery within our borders,"
3 FARRAND 437, which seems to imply congressional power over the domestic as well as
the foreign slave trade.
20. 4 ELLIOT 102. "The word migration refers to free persons; but the word i nporta.
Lion refers to slaves because free people cannot be said to be imported." Iredell was
replying to James Galloway who, explaining that he wanted "this abominable trade
put an end to," did not, however, want the tax on importation "extended to all persons
whatsoever." The situation of North Carolina, he continued, required additional citizens;
so instead of "laying a tax, we ought to give a bounty to encourage foreigners to come
among us." Id. 101.
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point obtained from the Southern States. The appeals, therefore,that have been made to the humane & laudable prejudices of ourQuakers by our anti-federal writers upon the subject of negro
slavery, have been treated by that prudent society with silence
and contempt.21
This opinion respecting the temporarily dormant powers of Congress
was not confined to Rush. In the Pennsylvania ratifying convention
Thomas McKean also referred to a power in Congress to abolish
slavery:
In the first clause [of Article I, Section 9], there is a provision
made for an event which must gratify the feelings of every friend
to humanity. The abolition of slavery is put within the reach of
the federal government. 22
As early as October of 1787 Moses Brown of Rhode Island wrote to
James Pendleton in Pennsylvania:
It seems to Exhibit a poor Example of Confidence in Congress theSouthern States being not willing to Leave the Commerce in Men
under [Congress's] Controul and Regulation as well as other mat-
ters .... [H]ad the period of 21 years been fixed for Abolishing
Slavery as some writers your way seem to represent, it would have
been doing something .... 23
Nor were such opinions confined to private letters. Noah Webster
wrote as follows in his tract written in defense of the proposed consti-
tution:
The truth is, Congress cannot prohibit the importation of slaves,
during that period; but the [state] laws against the importation
into particular states, stand unrepealed. An immediate abolition
of slavery would bring ruin upon the whites, and misery upon the
blacks, in the Southern states. The Constitution has therefore
wisely left each state to pursue its own measures, with respect to
this article of legislation, during the period of twenty-one years.24
21. Letter from Benjamin Rush to Jeremy Belknap, Feb. 28, 1788. 8 BELKNAP PAPERS,397 (Massachusetts Historical Society).
22. J. MCMASTER & F. STONE, PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 278(Historical Society of Pennsylvania 1888). Statements such as McKean's may have
accounted for the votes of the Quakers and for the failure of the antislavery anti.Federalists to mention Article i Section 9 in their statement of reasons for opposing
the Constitution. See Dissent of the Minority in Pennsylvania Packet, issue of December12, 1787. This dissent was signed by 21 of the 23 who voted against ratification.
23. Letter from Moses Brown to James Pendleton, Oct. 27, 1787. PENDLETON PAPERS(Historical Society of Pennsylvania) (emphasis added).
24. A CITIZEN OF THE U.S., ExAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF TIlE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 40 (1787).
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Thus there is evidence that the anti-slavery men in the Northern states
were assured by the Federalists that the bargain struck by them with
the South was of limited duration, and that after 1808 Congress would
possess the constitutional authority to act so as to abolish slavery. As
Thomas Dawes said in the Massachusetts ratifying convention, in a
few years slavery would be "abolished"; it would die not "of an apo-
plexy, but of a consumption," presumably at the hands of a Congress
exercising control over the internal, as well as the external, commerce
in slaves.2 5
The strongest argument in favor of the traditional interpretation of
Article I, Section 9 (reading "such persons" as including white aliens,
limiting the term "migration" to them, and hence denying congres-
sional authority to regulate the domestic slave trade under the com-
merce clause) is that had the alternative interpretation suggested here
been taken seriously, the anti-Federalists in the South would have
pointed to the threat to the institution of slavery represented by the
interstate commerce power in order to rally pro-slavery sentiment
against the proposed constitution. They did not do so. But their silence
on the point is not conclusive. It could mean, as the traditional account
would have it, that it was generally assumed that the clause referred
to free whites immigrating into the country, and therefore that no
power over interstate movement of slaves was implied. On the other
hand, particularly since almost all vocal Southern opinion in the Con-
stitutional Convention and the ratification debates was ultimately
opposed to slavery, it could mean that the South was willing to concede
what the North was in time going to insist upon: a power to limit
slavery to its present boundaries. There seemed to be an assumption
that, as Zachariah Johnson put it during the ratifying debates in Vir-
ginia, whether emancipation came late or soon, it was certain to
come.26 Congressional power over the interstate slave trade would pose
no threat to men with such expectations.
Nevertheless, it is surprising how little was said in the South con-
cerning this clause, surprising because the clause obviously affected
commerce in slaves in some manner and because, just as obviously,
Congress was being given authority to regulate domestic as well as
25. 1788 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONvENTION OF TIlE COMMONWEALTH OF
MALssAcnusETs 502-03 (1856) (minutes of Judge Theophilus Parsons). This language was
quoted several times in the course of the ,Massachusetts debates.
Not all Massachusetts delegates were opposed to slavery. Benjamin Randall responded
to Dawes by saying that he was "sorry to hear it said that after 1808 negroes would 
be
free." Id. S03.
26. 3 ELLIOT 648.
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foreign commerce. Even in Virginia, where the debates were particu-
larly thorough and extensive, only a handful of references to the clause
were made. And is it not astonishing that in the South Carolina ratify.
ing convention the clause was not mentioned, even in passing?
In the Virginia debates George Mason deplored the fact that the
proposed constitution permitted the "nefarious" slave trade for an-
other 20 years, as well as its failure to include a provision "securing to
the Southern States [the slaves] they now possess"-which Lee of West-
moreland ridiculed as "two contradictory reasons" for opposing the
Constitution.27 Mason repeated these complaints four days later and
was this time answered by Madison, who pointed out that however
deplorable a temporary continuation of this "traffic" might be, the
situation was at least an improvement because under the Articles of
Confederation "it might be continued forever." He then went on to
assure Mason that the "general government" would possess no power
to "interpose with respect to the property in slaves now held by the
states. '28 John Tyler, who like Mason later voted against ratification,
followed by condemning the "impolicy, iniquity, and disgracefulness
of this wicked traffic," and was answered by George Nicholas with
much the same arguments that Madison had, a few minutes earlier,
used against Mason.29 In response to the fear that Congress would
emancipate the slaves already held, Nicholas added that Congress
"would only have a general superintendency of trade" after 1808. The
Southern states, he said, had "insisted on this exception to that general
superintendency for twenty years." 30 Shortly thereafter Governor Ran-
dolph, in an effort to meet the anti-Federalist argument concerning
powers implied in the Constitution, used language suggesting, as had
Nicholas, that Congress's powers after 1808 would extend to more than
the mere importation of slaves:
But the insertion of the negative restrictions [in Article I, Sec-
tion 9] has given cause of triumph, it seems, to gentlemen. They
suppose that it demonstrates that Congress are to have powers by
implication .... I persuade myself that every exception here men-
tioned is an exception, not from general powers, but from the par-
ticular powers therein vested. To what power in the general gov-




30. Id. 456 (emphasis added).
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negroes? . . . This is an exception from the power given them
of regulating commerce.
31
Except for a later speech by Randolph repeating what he had already
said and a passing reference by Mason, these were the only references
to the clause during the Virginia debates.
In the South Carolina debates, if we are to believe the official journal
of the convention as well as the local newspapers at the time, nothing
at all was said respecting this clause. Yet South Carolina even then was
the state most closely associated with the cause of slavery. The conven-
tion debated the proposed constitution clause by clause, finishing its
discussion of Article I, Section 8, on Friday, May 16, 1788. The fol-
lowing day, discussion began with Article I, Section 10. Nor, as the
convention proceeded through to the end of the Constitution, did it
return to the missing clause. Is it possible to believe that this was the
only part of the Constitution that was of no interest to the South
Carolina convention, the only clause that provoked neither debate nor
acknowledgment? Yet, while it received some mention earlier in the
legislature, 32 all the sources agree that it was ignored officially in the
ratifying convention, and none of them provides any clue as to what
was said unofficially, for example, on that Friday night.
33
Aside from the remarks of Wilson, Iredell, and Galloway in the
Pennsylvania and North Carolina ratifying debates,
34 the only other
suggestion at this time that "such persons" might include persons other
than slaves is to be found in an exchange between Gouverneur Morris
and George Mason in the Constitutional Convention itself. The second
part of the migration or importation provision as reported by the Com-
mittee of Eleven read as follows: ".... but a tax or duty may be imposed
on such migration or importation at a rate not exceeding the average
of duties laid on imports." Morris pointed out "that as the clause now
stands [i.e., using the term "such persons" rather than "slaves"]
it implies that the Legislature may tax freemen imported."
3' Mason
31. Id. 464 (emphasis added).
32. 4 ELLIOT 272-309.
33. Elliot prints only a few speeches from the South Carolina convention. I _,cd
xeroxed copies of the accounts in the South Carolina newspapers. dhe City Gazette and
the State Gazette, and of the official Journal in the possession of the National Historical
Publications Commission of the National Archives (Project: Documentary History of the
Ratification of the Constitution and the First Ten Amendments). The first volume under
this title will be published in 1969. I am grateful to the project's director, Profksor
Robert Cushman, my distinguished predecessor in constitutional law at Cornell. and
to his associate, Leonard Rapport, for allowing me to consult their files of documents.
34. See p. 203 supra.
35. 2 FARRAND 417.
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then replied that the "provision as it stands was necessary for the case
of Convicts in order to prevent the introduction of them."3 0 The out-
come of this exchange was an amendment, adopted unanimously, to
allow a tax or duty to be imposed only on the importation-and not
on the migration-of "such persons." 7
This exchange between Morris and Mason and the remarks of
Wilson, Iredell, and Galloway are, to repeat, the only evidence con-
temporary with the adoption of the Constitution that the term "such
persons" was meant to be anything but a euphemism for "slaves." On
the other hand, the record is equally barren of any statement that the
word "migration" was intended to refer to the domestic slave trade.88
That is to say, no one expressly stated that after 1808 Congress would
be empowered to forbid the migration of slaves even among the states
originally existing.3 9 As we have seen, however, a number of men
36. Id. Mason's defense of the provision, with its reference to convicts as beingamong the "such persons" the migration or importation of which Congress is forbiddento prohibit prior to 1808, is altogether confusing. How does the "provision preventthe introduction" of convicts? As it stands, Congress is forbidden to prevent the introduc-tion of them prior to 1808. Did Mason mean that the tax or duty would prevent theirintroduction? But no one looked upon the tax or duty as being capable of preventingthe introduction of slaves. Why, then, would it have this effect on the Introduction
of convicts? And if the Convention was determined to exclude convicts, why walt until1808 to do so, and why rely on a tax to be the means of discouraging their "migration"prior to 1808? If we are to believe that the word migration refers to convicts, as Masonmight be understood to imply, furthermore, then the clause as finally adopted, withMason's approval, provides no means whatever, prior to 1808, of preventing their
"introduction"-
One possible explanation of Mason's confusing statement would go as follows: (1) it isnot clear whether Congress can prohibit convicts and slaves from entering the country;(2) this clause, by placing a temporary limitation on Congress's commerce power, doesmake it clear that such a power exists, or will exist after 1808; (3) such a commercepower is necessary to enable Congress to prohibit excessive "migration" of convicts,
although such "migration" should be permitted for a while in view of the need Incertain areas for manpower. The trouble with this interpretation is that It assumes thatby "provision" Mason was referring to the commerce clause, whereas the contextindicates Article I, Section 9.37. Id. The supporters of the usual view that "migration" refers to white aliens
sometimes point to the fact that the tax or duty is allowed only on the "Importation"(of slaves) and not on the "migration" (of white aliens). This proves nothing at all.Congress is forbidden by the fifth clause of the same Article I, Section 9 to lay any "Taxor Duty . . . on Articles exported from any State"--including, we suggest, slaves whomigrate as articles of the interstate slave trade. Thus, in accordance with this policyor principle, the tax or duty could only be laid on importation from abroad.38. It was not unusual, however, to use the word "migration" to mean Internal
movement. For example, Rawlins Lowndes so used it in the South Carolina ratificationdebates: "With respect to migration from the Eastern States to the Southern ones, [1] donot believe that people [will] ever flock here in such considerable numbers." 4 ELLIOT309. Indeed, Taney uses the word in that sense in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19How.) 393, 422 (1857).39. As has been suggested above, the absence from the record of any statement to theeffect that Congress's power over the domestic slave trade was as extensive as its powerover the foreign slave trade need not be taken as evidence for the contrary proposition.Everyone saw the importation and migration clause as a limitation on Congress's com-merce powers. It was obvious. Was it not equally obvious that Congress's regulatory
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did say, in one way or another, that after 1808 Congress would be able
to act as to abolish slavery or to bring about its abolition.
40
Nor can the inconclusive nature of available evidence contempora-
neous with the adoption of the Constitution be made up for by looking
to later interpretations of the clause, however clear they may seem.
Opinions expressed on the question of congressional power over com-
merce in slaves in the years following the establishment of the Gov-
ernment are inevitably colored by the writer's views on the increasingly
sensitive slavery question, and are therefore suspect. This became clear
as early as 1790 during the debate in the House of Representatives on
the anti-slavery petitions presented by the Pennsylvania Quakers and
by Benjamin Franklin's Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery.
p extended to commerce "among the several states" as well as the commerce ".ith
fe nnations'? If the power to prohibit the "importation" of slaves was admitted by
everyone to be a regulation of commerce with foreign nations, vhat argument was
needed to show that the power to prohibit the "migration" of Javes from state to
state was a regulation of commerce among the several statesl It was intended to restrict
this power for twenty years, and are not the words used well adapted to that end: the
temporary restriction on laws prohibiting "importation" expressing the exception to
Congress's power to regulate foreign commerce, and the temporary' restriction on laws
prohibiting "migration" expressing the exception to Congress's power to regulate com-
merce among the states? As George Nicholas said in the Virginia debates, after 1603
Congress would have a "general superintendency of trade." 3 EL.uoT 456. And it was
probably out of a concern for this employment of the commerce power that the later
Madison, the states' rights Madison, argued that Congress's power to regulate commerce
among the states was of less extent than its power to regulate foreign commerce. Dis-
cussing the interstate commerce power in a letter to Joseph C. Cabell on February 13,
1829, he wrote: "Being in the same terms with the power over foreign commerce, the
same extent, if taken literally, would belong to it. Yet it is very certain that it grew out
of the abuse of the power by the importing states in taxing the non-importing, and was
intended as a negative and preventive provision against injustice among the States
themselves, rather than as a power to be used for the positive purposes of the General
Government, in which alone, however, the remedial power could be lodged. And It will
be safer to leave the power with this key to it, than to extend it all the qualities and
incidental means belonging to the power over foreign commerce ... " 4 LnTmns AxD
OTAE WRITINa OF JAMES MADISON 14-15 (1867).
40. Indeed, James Madison himself, contrary to what he was to sy later, hinted
as much in the First Congress during the debate on the first of the antislavery petitions
presented by the Quakers:
He admitted, that Congress is restricted by the Constitution from taking measures
to abolish the slave trade; yet there are a variety of ways by which it could
countenance the abolition, and regulations might be made in relation to the
introduction of them into the new States to be formed out of the Western Territory.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1246 (1790) [1789-1824]. The version of this speech printed in 4
ELLIoT 408 is even more suggestive:
He [Mr. Madison] entered into a critical review of the circumstances respecting
the adoption of the Constitution; the ideas upon the limitation of the vowers of
Congress to interfere in the regulation of the commerce in slaves, and dowing
that they undeniably were not precluded from interposing in their importation; and
generally, to regulate the mode in which every species of business shall be transacted.
He adverted to the western country and the cession of Georgia, in vwhich Congress
have certainly the power to regulate the subject of slavery; which shows gentlemen
are mistaken in supposing that Congress cannot constitutionally interfere in the
business in any degree whatever. [Emphasis added.]
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The petitions were referred to a special committee which reported in
part as follows:
That, from the nature of the matters contained in these memo-
rials, they were induced to examine the powers vested in Congress,
under the present Constitution, relating to the Abolition of Slav-
ery, and are clearly of opinion:
First, That the general government is expressly restrained from
prohibiting the importation of such persons as any of the States
now existing shall think proper to admit until the year 1808.
Secondly, That Congress, by a fair construction of the Constitu-
tion, are equally restrained from interfering in the emancipation
of slaves, who already are, or who may, within the period men-
tioned [i.e., prior to 1808], be imported into, or born within, any
of the said States.4 1
Smith of South Carolina greeted this report, and not without reason,
with the statement that it "appeared to hold out the idea that Congress
might exercise the power of emancipating after the year 1808." Elias
Boudinot of New Jersey admitted as much, saying that "Congress could
not interfere in prohibiting the importation, or promoting the emanci-
pation of them prior to that period." 42 Smith and his Southern col-
leagues therefore moved that the Report of the Special Committee be
referred to the Committee of the Whole House, which in its report
replaced the offensive second paragraph with a new one stating flatly
that "Congress have no authority to interfere in the emancipation of
slaves, or in the treatment of them within any of the States .... ,,4a
The House, some of its members obviously being in a conciliatory
mood, voted 29-25 to insert both reports in the Journal,44 thereby ac-
knowledging its indecision, or its inability to agree, on this matter of
constitutional interpretation.
The same sort of disagreement occurred in 1798 during the debate
on the alien part of the infamous Alien and Sedition Laws. Somewhat
at a loss to explain where the Constitution authorized Congress to
enact a law expelling aliens, one of the supporters of the Alien Friends
bill, Samuel Sewell of Massachusets, hit upon the commerce clause.
Robert Williams of North Carolina then replied that he thought it
"a curious idea, that all emigrants coming to this country should be
41. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1465 (1790) [1789-1824].
42. Id. 1504, 1517.
43. Id. 1524 (emphasis added).
44. Id. 1523. The vote was largely along North-South lines, 23 of the 29 members
of the majority coming from the North, and five of the remaining six being Virginians,
led by Madison.
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considered as articles of commerce." But even if it were granted, he
continued, Congress's power is limited to "laying a tax of ten dollars
upon their migration, as the migration cannot be prohibited till the
year 1808." How, he asked, can "gentlemen . . . contend, from this
clause of the Constitution, that Congress has a right to prevent the
migration of foreigners, or remove them after they arrive"? If this
could be done, then slaves "may also be sent out of the country," and
the Southern states would never permit this.45 The power to expel
aliens conjured in the minds of the Southerners the prospect of a fed-
eral law expelling slaves. Abraham Baldwin of Georgia then took up
the cause of the South, which led to an interesting exchange on the
precise point of the meaning of the term "such persons." He thought
Article I, Section 9, "forbidding Congress to prohibit the migration,
etc., was directly opposed to the principle of this bill."
He recollected very well that when the 9th section ... was under
consideration in the Convention, the delegates from some of the
Southern States insisted that the prohibition of the introduction
of slaves should be left to the State Governments; it was found
expedient to make this provision in the Constitution; there was
an objection to the use of the word slaves, as Congress by none of
their acts had ever acknowledged the existence of such a condition.
It was at length settled on the words as they now stand, "that the
migration or importation of such persons as the several states shall
think proper to admit, should not be prohibited till the year
1808." It was observed by some gentlemen present that this ex-
pression would extend to other persons besides slaves, which was
not denied, but this did not produce any alteration of it.40
This statement was hotly contradicted by the Speaker of the House,
Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey, who happened to be the only member
of the House who had been a delegate to the Constitutional Conven-
tion. Baldwin's words could only be ascribed "either to absolute for-
getfulness, or to willful misrepresentation," he said, made "to suit the
particular purposes of the opponents of the Alien bill." He insisted
that "in the discussion of [Article I, Section 9's] merits, no question
arose, or was agitated respecting the admission of foreigners, but on
the contrary, that it was confined simply to slaves ...." Everyone knew
the reasons for changing the term. And
until the present debate arose, he had never heard that any one
member supposed that the simple change of the term would en-
45. 8 ANNALs OF CONG. 1963 (1798) [1789-1824].
46. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1968-69 (1798) [1789-1824]; 3 FARP-thm 376.
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large the construction of this prohibitory provision, as it was now
contended for. If it could have been conceived to be really liable
to such interpretation, he was convinced that it would not have
been adopted, for it would then carry with it a strong injunction
upon Congress to prohibit the introduction of foreigners into the
newly erected states immediately, and into the then existing states
after the year 1808, as it undoubtedly does, that of slaves after that
period. 47
Since the records of the Convention are almost completely barren on
this question, it is impossible to determine who, Baldwin or Dayton,
is correct. As we saw above,48 Gouverneur Morris had indeed raised
a question concerning the meaning of the clause, but whether this
gave rise to an agitation "respecting the admission of foreigners," we
cannot know.
What we do know, however, is that Baldwin's version became the
Southerners' version, the version insisted on by the friends of or
apologists for slavery. And we do know that the number of these apol-
ogists increased with the passage of time, and that opinions on the
constitutional question, including those offered by Jefferson and
Madison, changed accordingly. Dayton and his friends were to hear
this Southern argument many times in the years that followed, espe-
cially during the Missouri controversy in 1819-20, though perhaps
nowhere in a more specious version than that put forward by Charles
Pinckney in the House of Representatives on February 14, 1820.
The term, or word, migration, applies wholly to free whites..
The reasons of its being adopted and used in the Constitution
. . . were these; that the Constitution being a frame of govern-
ment, consisting wholly of delegated powers, all power, not ex-
pressly delegated, being reserved to the people or the states, It
was supposed, that, without some express grant to them of power
on the subject, Congress would not be authorized ever to touch
the question of migration hither, or emigration to this country,
however pressing or urgent the necessity for such a measure
might be; that they could derive no such power from the usages
of nations, or even the laws of war; that the latter would only
enable them to make prisoners of alien enemies, which would
not be sufficient, as spies or other dangerous emigrants, who were
not alien enemies, might enter the country for tteasonable pur-
poses, and do great injury . . .49
47. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1993 (1798) [1789-1824]; 8 FARRAND 377-78.
48. P. 207 supra.
49. 36 ANNALS OF CONG. 1316 (1820) [1789-1824]; 3 FARRAND 443 (emphasis added).
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In short, Article L Section 9 had now become not a limitation on
Congress's commerce powers, but a grant of powerl Without the clause,
its powers being limited to those "expressly delegated," Congress
would not have been able to enact immigration laws! The article is
a "negative pregnant, restraining for twenty years, and giving the
power after." So pressing was the need to protect the country against
these "spies or other dangerous emigrants" that the constitutional con-
vention deliberately deprived Congress of all power to deal with
them for twenty yearsl After this palpable nonsense, no one should
be surprised to read Pinckney's conclusion that Congress's power to
regulate commerce "between the States" was limited to "the com-
merce by water." Congress must be denied all power that touched
the subject of slavery, and any argument, however specious, would
be advanced in that cause.
To recapitulate briefly: the question of the extent of congressional
power over slavery was intimately related to the meaning of the term
"such persons" as it appears in the "migration or importation" clause
in Article I, Section 9. We have seen that the term was a euphemism
for slaves, adopted in order to avoid using "expressions which might
be odious in the ears of Americans." A few men, with the exception
of James Wilson all Southerners, used the term in a manner compre-
hending persons other than slaves-convicts, for example, or free
whites. As to the clause as a whole, originally everyone saw it as a
temporary restriction on Congress's power to regulate commerce-a
power that extends to commerce among the states (and not merely by
water) as well as to foreign commerce. It was also clear to everyone
that slaves were capable of being articles of commerce. Thus, a num-
ber of men, 0 mostly Northerners but including James Madison, as-
sumed that Congress, after 1808, would possess the authority, pre-
sumably derived from the power to regulate commerce, to abolish
slavery, or to abolish slavery in some places, or to act in a manner
calculated to have the effect of abolishing slavery. It is suggested, for
example, that the antislavery Quakers of Pennsylvania would not
have voted to ratify the Constitution without assurance that Congress
would possess such a power; while, on the other hand, there were
doubtless Southerners who would not have voted to ratify the Consti-
tution unless they had believed that Congress would not possess such
a power. The testimony of the men immediately concerned is thus not
50. Including, in one of its voices, a majority of the first House of Representatives. See
p. 210 supra.
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conclusive of the proper interpretation of Article I, Section 9. While
the historical record demonstrates that the traditional reading of the
clause can no longer be accepted without question, it is necessary to
turn to a different mode of analysis to establish that the interpretation
suggested here is more probably the originally intended meaning.
II.
The clause in question reads: "The Migration or Importation of
Such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to
admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one
thousand eight hundred and eight .... ." At the very least this wording
leaves Congress free, even before 1808, to prohibit the importation of
slaves from abroad into a territory or a new state. Indeed, Congress
exercised this power when organizing the Mississippi Territory,
formed out of Georgia's western lands, and earlier when it re-enacted
the law governing the Northwest Territory.5 ' Why, it is natural to
ask, was this temporary restriction on the power of Congress itself re-
stricted to the states originally existing? It seems obvious that the pur-
pose of the clause's particular wording was to enable Congress to
prevent the spread of slavery beyond the boundaries of the existing
slave states, without, at least for a time, encroaching on the estab-
lished slave trade within them. 52 If the term "migration" were read as
referring only to the immigration of free aliens from abroad and not
to the interstate movement of slaves, however, as the South later in-
sisted, this purpose could be defeated with ridiculous ease. Of what
use is a power to prohibit the importation of slaves from abroad into
newly created states or territories, if South Carolina or Georgia could
import slaves and transport them with impunity into the same states
or territories? If any force at all is to be accorded the limited congres-
sional power to prohibit importation before 1808, the term "migra-
tion" must be read as referring to the internal movement of slaves.
Only such an interpretation is consistent with the power Congress
was given to prevent the spread of slavery. And only when, under
increasing economic pressure from the North, the South became con-
51. See note 58 infra.
52. It should be remembered that at the time of the Constitutional Convention nearly
everyone viewed slavery as an evil which must and would be abolished as soon as
practicable. The general aversion on the part of the Convention to speaking or thinking
of slavery as a permanent and viable institution was clearly illustrated by the delegates'
refusal to permit the word "slave" to appear in the Constitution.
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cerned with the territorial expansion of slavery, did it become neces-
sary to reinterpret "migration" so as to deny the existence of any
congressional power over interstate traffic in slaves.
Madison, who was so emphatic on the lack of national power over
the internal slave trade in his 1819 letter to Robert Walsh,c seems to
have been of a different opinion at the time he, along with Hamilton
and Jay, was urging the adoption of the new Constitution:
It were doubtless to be wished that the power of prohibiting
the importation of slaves had not been postponed until the year
1808, or rather that it had been suffered to have immediate oper-
ation. But it is not difficult to account either for this restriction
on the general government, or for the manner in which the
whole clause is expressed. It ought to be considered as a great
point gained in favor of humanity that a period of twenty years
may terminate forever, within these States, a traffic which has so
long and so loudly upbraided the barbarism of modern policy ....
Attempts have been made to pervert this clause into an objec-
tion against the Constitution by representing it on one side as a
criminal toleration of an illicit practice, and on another as cal-
culated to prevent voluntary and beneficial emigration from Eu-
rope to America. I mention these misconstructions not with a
view to give them an answer, for they deserve none, but as spec-
imens of the manner and spirit in which some have thought fit
to conduct their opposition to the proposed government.5"
Taking the phrase "within these states" at its face value, this 1788
opinion seems incompatible with what Madison wrote to Robert
Walsh in 1819 during the Missouri dispute. It is difficult to see how
Congress could have abolished the barbarous traffic (this "illicit prac-
tice") "within these States" unless it possessed a power over the move-
ment of slaves from place to place "within these States," a power over
the internal slave trade, and a power that was only temporarily and
partially denied it by the clause in question. Until 1808 Congress was
forbidden to prohibit the importation of slaves from abroad into the
states then existing (but not into new states or territories) and the
migration of slaves into or within the states then existing (but not
into or within new states or territories). Migration, Madison is saying
in 1788, is not to be understood as referring to "voluntary and bene-
ficial emigrations from Europe to America"; the opponents of the
new Constitution who have introduced this "misconstruction" into
53. Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh, Nov. 27, 1819. 3 FaV,.wD 436.
54. THE FEDERA=IST No. 42, at 272-73 (Hod. Lib. ed. 1937) (Madison) (emphasis
added).
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the debates do not even deserve an answer-in 1788. But by 1819,
and in fact long before then, Madison had himself adopted this "per-
verted" view. Walsh taxed him with being inconsistent. He replied
to Madison's letter of November 27, 1819, pointing out that it was
inconsistent with the views Madison had expressed in Federalist 42.
Madison replied as follows:
It is far from my purpose to resume a subject on which I have,
perhaps, already exceeded the proper limits. But, having spoken
with so confident a recollection of the meaning attached by the
convention to the term "migration," which seems to be an impor-
tant hinge to the argument, I may be permitted merely to remark
... that a consistency of the passage cited from the Federalist,
with my recollections, is preserved by the discriminating term
"beneficial," added to voluntary emigrations from Europe to
America. 55
It is difficult to understand how Madison thought this one word
would save him. Why was it a misconstruction to say that Article I,
Section 9 was "calculated to prevent voluntary and beneficial emigra-
tions from Europe to America," and why would it not have been a
misconstruction to say the clause was "calculated to prevent voluntary
... emigrations from Europe to America"? What difference is made
by the adjective "beneficial"? For twenty years the clause will not
prevent any kind of immigration into the original states; after twenty
years-to assume with the 1820 Madison that "such persons" also
refers to persons other than slaves-Congress would have the power
to prevent the "migration" of every variety of European immigrant,
beneficial as well as baneful.
Of course Madison may have meant that although after 1808 Con-
gress would certainly have the power to forbid voluntary emigration
into the states originally existing, it could be assumed that Congress
would not exercise its power so as to exclude beneficial voluntary emi-
gration. In other words, Madison could be saying that Congress can
be trusted to use its authority to prohibit the "migration" only of
those white persons we do not want and not to exclude those white
persons, those beneficial immigrants, we are eager to admit. He did
not say this, but such an interpretation allows us to make some sense
of what he did say.
Some sense, yes, but not very much. For the fact is that whereas
55. Letter from Madison to Walsh, Jan. 11, 1820. 3 LErraES AND OTHER WRITIN S OF
JAMES MADISON 163-64 (1876); 3 FARRAND 438.
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under this interpretation Madison is saying that the clause reflects a
trust in Congress wisely to exercise the power over immigration, the
necessary implication of the fact that Congress was forbidden before
1808 to prohibit the migration of "such persons" is that the Founders
were not willing to trust Congress with a power over migration into
the original statesl Not, that is, until 1808. Madison cannot have it
both ways. Once committed to the position that "migration" refers to
free aliens, he cannot escape self-contradiction.
Nor is this all. The original question still remains unanswered:
why was Article I, Section 9's temporary restriction on the power of
Congress itself restricted to the states originally existing? According
to the latter-day Madisonian interpretation, although Congress would
be forbidden until 1808 to prohibit the migration of free whites into
the original states, it would not be forbidden during this period to
prohibit their migration into the new states to be formed out of the
Western Territories. Can this distinction be explained by any policy
favored by the Southern, or even Northern, states in 1787? The dif-
ference with respect to the power over the importation of slaves is
readily explained: South Carolina and Georgia wanted more slaves
and hoped to import a sufficient number during the 20-year period of
grace, while the Founders, conceding this to South Carolina and
Georgia, limited the concession to them and the other original states
in order to keep slaves out of the new states. That a similar distinction
should have been made with respect to the migration of free whites
is difficult to understand. Can it be argued that the original states
also wanted to make certain that they would not be forbidden to
admit beneficial white immigrants and, at the same time, that they
were unconcerned about the migration of whites into the western
lands? On the contrary, the record shows an intense concern with
such migration. In the Virginia ratifying convention, for example,
considerable time was spent discussing the question of the navigation
of the Mississippi River. There was some fear that under the proposed
constitution the new government might give up the right of free
navigation which, the anti-Federalists argued, would jeopardize Vir-
ginia's policy of populating the western lands adjacent to the river.
Under the Articles of Confederation, said William Grayson, people
would continue to settle in these western lands, but deprive them of
the hope and "privilege of navigating that river.., and the emigra-
tion will cease." It is interesting that during this discussion no refer-
ence was made by Grayson or Patrick Henry or any of the other anti-
Federalists to Article I, Section 9; yet if the Southern interpretation
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of the clause is correct, Congress would have had the power to pro-
hibit the migration of free whites into any part of the western lands
lying outside the boundaries of the original states, both before and
after 1808.56 As General Heath said in the Massachusetts convention,
the "migration or importation, etc., is confined to the states now
existing only; new states cannot claim it."57
In short, if the term "such persons" was intended to cover free white
immigrants as well as slaves, it does not appear to make any sense to
distinguish, as the clause does, between the states originally existing
and any new states that would be formed.
Quite apart from the internal logic of Article I, Section 9, moreover,
there is legislative evidence that Congress considered itself empowered
to deal with the internal movement of slaves into the territories and
new states formed from them. General Heath, in the passage just cited,
goes on to point out that the Continental Congress, "by their ordinance
for erecting new states, some time since, declared that the new states
shall be republican, and that there shall be no slavery in them." He was
referring to the famous Northwest Ordinance of 1787, enacted by the
Continental Congress while the new Constitution was being written
in Philadelphia, which provided in its sixth article that there "shall be
neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory ... ."
It is important to note here, for reasons that will soon become dear,
that in one of the first statutes passed under the new Constitution,
Congress re-enacted the Ordinance,5 8 affirming its intention to follow
the policy of the old Congress in keeping slavery out of the states to
be formed from the western lands. Does this not indicate a belief that
the national government possessed the authority to implement this
policy? And is it not obvious that such a policy could have been
defeated not only by the introduction of slaves from abroad, but also
by the introduction of slaves from the states already existing? It was
certainly obvious to the Congress that in 1804 enacted the law establish-
ing the Territory of Orleans. In the tenth section of that statute
Congress not only forbade the importation of slaves from abroad, but
went on to add that it "shall not be lawful for any person or persons
to import or bring into the said territory, from any port or place with-
in the limits of the United States ... any slave or slaves, which shall
56. 3 ELLIOT 849-65.
57. 2 ELLIOT 115.
58. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8; 1 Stat. 50. The actual form of action taken was stated
as a law "to adapt the [Ordinance] to the [new] Constitution of the United States."
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have been imported since the first day of May [1798], into any port or
place within the limits of the United States ... ."59 This is a law
regulating the movement of slaves within the United States. It does,
at least as to slaves brought into the country after 1798, precisely what
had to be done to enforce Congress's powers under the commerce clause
and Article I, Section 9. As has been pointed out above, no purpose
would be served by prohibiting the importation of slaves from abroad
if they could, prior to 1808, be imported into South Carolina and then
sent on to a new state or territory. In 1804 Congress understood this
very well, and sought to prevent it by exercising either its power over
the "migration" of "such persons" into a new territory-a power
derived from its general authority over commerce among the states
and, even before 1808, not limited by Article I, Section 9-or its
authority to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory ... belonging to the United States .... ."00
In his 1819 letter to Walsh, Madison slides over this aspect of the
1804 Act. Indeed, it might even be said that he actively misrepresents
it, although he concedes implicitly that the power being exercised was
the power to regulate commerce. Congress, he says, "lost no time in
applying the prohibitory power to Louisiana, which having maritime
ports, might be an inlet for slaves from abroad. But they forebore to
extend the prohibition to the introduction of slaves from other parts
of the Union."6 1 Not content with this flat misstatement of fact, Madi-
son goes right on to deny that Congress, in any of the "Territorial
governments created by them," had ever forbidden the existence of
slavery. This statement apparently caused him some uneasiness, for
two pages later he refers to the Northwest Ordinance, a piece of
legislation of which Walsh could not be presumed to be ignorant. But
he says of the Ordinance that it "proceeded from the old Congress,
acting, with the best intentions, but under a charter which contains no
shadow of the authority exercised." No mention whatever is made of
the fact-and it must certainly have been known to him, for he was a
member of the Congress that enacted the statute, and himself voted
for it-that one of the first pieces of business in the new Congress,
59. Act of March 26, 1804, ch. 38; 2 Stat. 283, 286. Unfortunately the Annals of
Congress do not record the debate, either in the House or the Senate. on this provision.
It was adopted by a vote of 21-7. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 242 (1804) [1789-1824]. A similar
prohibition ('inhibiting" the admission of all slaves into Louisiana) was adopted by the
House by a vote of 40-36. Id. 1186.
60. U.S. CONsr. art. IV, § 3.
61. Letter to Robert Walsh, Nov. 27, 1819.9 J. MADISON, WRrMINGS 5 (G. Hunt ed. 1910).
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acting under the authority of the new Constitution, was to re-enact this
famous anti-slavery ordinance.02
Nor was this the only example of Madison's willingness to use
specious arguments to support his Southern views on the slavery ques-
tion. In this same letter to Walsh he asserts that nothing was said in
the Constitutional Convention indicating an intention to prevent the
spread of slavery, a statement that cannot be believed. He then added
the following:
The case of the N. Western Territory was probably superseded
by the provision against the importation of slaves by South Caro-
lina and Georgia, which had not then passed laws prohibiting it.
When the existence of slavery in that territory was precluded [by
the Northwest Ordinance], the importation of slaves was rapidly
going on, and the only mode of checking it was by narrowing the
space open to them. It is not an unfair inference that the expedient
would not have been undertaken, if the power afterward given to
terminate the importation everywhere, had existed or been even
anticipated.63
Consider first this last statement. Madison says that the provision pro-
hibiting slavery in the Northwest Territory would not have been
adopted had the Continental Congress anticipated the powers subse-
quently given to Congress in the new Constitution to forbid the im-
portation of slaves. But when the new Congress re-enacted the North-
west Ordinance in 1789, they did know about this constitutional power
and they did enact legislation designed to forbid slavery in the terri-
tories. Consider next the statement that the Northwest Ordinance
prohibition was "probably superseded by the provision against impor-
tation by S. Carolina and Georgia . . . ." What provision? Does he
mean the act of Congress, effective January 1, 1808, forbidding all
importation into the United States? But when it was enacted the only
state permitting importation was South Carolina. So he must be
referring to the Georgia statute of 1798 and the South Carolina statute
of 1792 (repealed in 1803) forbidding importation from abroad, they
being the only two states permitting importation at the time of the
Northwest Ordinance.64 Thus, these state laws superseded an act of
Congress! This from the father of the Constitution whose supremacy
clause states the opposite.
62. P. 218 supra.
63. Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh, supra note 61, at 9-10.
64. W.E.B. DuBois, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE TO TIE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, 1638-1870, at 70-93 (1896).
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Walsh certainly was not deceived by the misinformation supplied
him by Madison. In an "able and eloquent" monograph published
shortly thereafter, and apparently long since forgotten,65 he developed
at some length the argument advanced here respecting Congress's
power over the internal slave trade. To him
the whole text [of Article I, Section 9] bespeaks a compromise in
which, on the one hand, the privilege of multiplying the race of
slaves within their limits, either by importations from abroad or
domestic migration is reluctantly yielded for a term to those
southern states who made this compliance a sine qua non of their
accession to the union; while, on the other hand, the power is
conceded, by implication, to the federal government, of preventing
at once the extension of slavery beyond the limits of the old states
-- of keeping the territory of the union, and the new states, free
from the pestilence; and ultimately of suppressing altogether the
diabolical trade in human flesh, whether internal or external00
To him the words "such persons" refer "exclusively to negro slaves,"
with the result that "migration" refers to the movement of slaves
among the states and territories. Congress had to have this power,
Walsh argues, because most of the territories and new states were,
or would be,
inland, and slaves could not be imported into them, but through
the old states; which last circumstance-owing to the facility of
concealing beyond detection, the foreign origin of slaves intro-
duced,--would render futile any prohibitory regulations as to
mere importation.67
As to the failure of Congress to forbid slavery in the new states of
Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi, this did not bespeak
a lack of constitutional authority; it derived rather from the fact that
the states of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia,
who owned the lands out of which these new states were formed, had
insisted, in the acts ceding the lands to the United States, that slavery
be permitted in them. But in the Northwest Territory and the Orleans
Territory, part of the purchase from Napoleon's France, Congress
65. The words of praise are from 17 NIrs REGisrmR 307 (Jan. 8, 1820). noting the
publication of the work. The Dictionary of American Biography, although it contains
a sizeable article on Walsh, does not mention the monograph.
66. R. WALSH, ON THE SPIRIT OF THE FEDERAL CONSrTrrtrON, THE PFAcTICE OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNION, RESPECTING THE E.XCLUSION
OF SLAVERY FROm THE TERRrTORIES AND NEv STATES 17-18 (1819).
67. Id. 20.
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acted free of such inhibitions and was able to exercise fully the powers
bestowed on it by the Constitution.
III.
At the time of the Constitutional Convention the South, although
determined not to be stripped of the immediate benefits of slave-
holding by the Northern states, was not inclined to defend the virtue or
permanence of its "peculiar institution." In Federalist 42 the original
Madison could look forward to the day when the barbarous slave trade
would cease to exist within the United States, and men like Wilson
openly proclaimed that the new Constitution laid the foundation "for
banishing slavery .. .out of this country." But by the time of the
Alien Act debates the Southerners, Madison among them, were denying
congressional power over the internal slave trade; and in 1857 the
Supreme Court of the United States, headed by a Southerner, found
constitutional grounds for denying congressional power over slavery
even in the territories, a power Congress had exercised from the very
beginning.""
By 1857 most Southerners agreed with Lincoln that a house divided
against itself on an issue as fundamental as slavery could not stand.
Their solution, naturally enough, was to end the division by extending
slavery throughout the nation. Lincoln warned of this in his debates
with Douglas in 1858 when he showed how Taney's opinion in the
Dred Scott case laid the foundation for a future decision prohibiting
the states from excluding slavery from their limits. 9
Jefferson and Madison, of course, never became advocates of slavery
and did not espouse such a solution. Like most of their Southern
colleagues during this early period, however, they were determined to
keep the federal government from interfering with what to them was
a purely local matter. To borrow a modern turn of phrase from another
context, they were anti-antislavery men. Hence Jefferson's reaction to
the Missouri controversy and specifically to the antislavery opposition
to the admission of Missouri as a slave state. This was to him a Fed-
68. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
69. Harry V. Jaffa shows, contrary to some historians, that Lincoln was altogether
correct in his reading of the Dred Scott opinions on this issue. See H. JAFFA, CP1sis oF
phm HousE DvnmE 441-44 (1959). Until the Dred Scott case the right to hold property
in a slave was understood to derive from the laws of the states permitting slavery. In
Dred Scott, however, the Court solemnly declared that "the right of property in a slave
is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution'"-a change of tremendous
magnitude. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 895, 451 (1857) (emphasis added).
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eralist plot, "a mere party trick," whereby the Federalists hoped to
regain power by dividing the country along a geographical line that
coincided with a division based on a moral principle. In proposing that
Congress act to prevent slavery in Missouri, the antislavery people had
sounded "a fire bell in the night" that awakened him, he said, and
"filled [him] with terror." The regulation of "the condition of the
different descriptions of men composing a State," and of their migra-
tion within the country was "the exclusive right of every State." For
Congress to interfere would sound the "knell of the Union."1 0 The
antislavery people, and especially the new breed whose opposition to
slavery was sparked by an evangelical fervor, must not be permitted
to rule the country. To the same end, the powers of Congress must be
confined within the narrowest of limits. Hence the assiduous effort of
Southern judges, including Southern judges on the Supreme Court, to
deny any power to Congress over persons as subjects of commerce71
It is no doubt difficult to believe that men of the stature of Jefferson
and Madison could have joined in a more or less deliberate campaign
to distort the original meaning of the Constitution, and to do so on
behalf of slavery. But consider Jefferson's words just quoted. In 1820
he was claiming that the regulation of "the condition of the different
descriptions of men composing a state," and of their migration within
the country, was "the exclusive right of every state." Yet as President
he had approved the bill authorizing Ohio to adopt a state constitution
and to enter the Union-provided "the same shall be republican, and
not repugnant to the ordinance of the thirteenth of July [1787],
between the original states, and the people and States of the territory
northwest of the river Ohio."72 Whatever the wishes of the people in
the Ohio territory, they would not be permitted to enter the Union
except as a free state: dearly Congress, in imposing such conditions
upon Ohio's entry into the Union, had exercised a power over "the
condition of the different descriptions of men composing a state." The
antislavery provision of the 1787 Ordinance, moreover, had itself
originated in a plan, drawn by Jefferson himself, to provide for the
government of the new states to be formed out of the territories. This
1784 plan extended not merely to the territory north and west of the
70. T. JEFFERSON, WoRKs (Ford ed. 1899) 157, 158, 162 (letters to John Holmes, April
22, 1820 and Charles Pinckney, Sept. 30, 1820).
71. New York v. Miln, 86 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837); Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.. (15
Pet.) 449, 507 (1841) (Taney, C. J., concurring); The Passenger Cases, 48 US. (7 How.) 283,
464 (Taney, C. J., dissenting).
72. Act of April 30, 1802, § 5, ch. 40; 2 Stat. 173.
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Ohio River, but "to all parts of the national domain," as Julian Boyd
puts it, "those already acquired as well as those to be acquired in the
future .... ,,T3This plan, which formed the basis of the 1784 ordinance
for the temporary government of the Northwest Territory, provided
that "after the year 1800 of the Christian era there shall be neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the said states . ..."
Although this antislavery provision was dropped from the 1784
Ordinance on final passage,74 it reappeared in a slightly altered version
in the famous 1787 Ordinance.
In 1789, as we have seen, Madison asserted that the Continental
Congress had had no authority to adopt such a provision;7 5 in 1820
Jefferson claimed that the states themselves, and only the states, had
any control of the subject; and in our own time Julian Boyd has written
that "there was nothing in the Articles of Confederation to warrant
the abolition of slavery. .... -76
Yet the Continental Congress, working with a provision drawn by
the earlier Jefferson, solemnly and officially forbade slavery not only in
the territory but in the states to be formed out of the territory. Where
did they think they got such authority? The final paragraph of Jeffer-
son's 1784 plan reads as follows:
[T]he preceding articles shall be formed into a Charter of Com-
pact, shall be duly executed by the President of the U.S. in Con-
gress Assembled [,] shall be promulgated, and shall stand as
fundamental constitutions between the thirteen original states,
and those now newly described, unalterable but by the joint con-
sent of the U.S. in Congress Assembled and of the particular
state within which such alteration is proposed to be made 77
Thus, according to Jefferson in 1784 and the entire Continental Con-
gress in 1787 (with the sole exception of Robert Yates of New York,
who also refused to vote for the new Constitution) the power to
prohibit slavery did not derive from a power to regulate commerce
73. 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JE FEo1 582 (J. Boyd ed. 1957).74. Six states of the nine present voted in favor of it, one short of the requirementfor passage. Of the 23 members voting, 16 voted in its favor. 26 JouVnRA OF VIE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 247 (G. Hunt ed. 1928).
75. Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh, Nov. 27, 1819. 3 FARRAND 436.
76. 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 73, at 588. As to how the anti-
slavery provision, deleted from the 1784 Ordinance was put back into the 1787 Ordinance,
see J. BARRETr, EvoLUTIoN OF THE ORDINANCE OF 1787, at 69, 76 (1891).
17. This is the version of Jefferson's plan as it appears in the Report of the Com-
mittee (March 1, 1784). 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 605 (1. Boyd ed. 1957).
Jefferson, along with Jeremiah Townley Chase and David Howell, was a member of this
committee. The language in the Report was altered slightly on final passnge. Id. 61.It appears, after further alteration, as Section 14 of the 1787 Ordinance.
224
Vol. 78: 198, 19fi8
The Constitution and the Migration of Slaves
among the states (the Articles of Confederation bestowed no such
power on Congress) or even from a power to govern the territories (in
Jefferson's plan the prohibition of slavery extended to the states as
well as the territories), but from a power to make a compact, in this
case a compact between the original states and the new states-states
not yet existing but "newly described."
Whatever the status, or the legality, of such a compact and the
powers derived from it,Th the Continental Congress reasserted them
in the 1787 Ordinance. The First Congress, acting under the new
Constitution, implicitly asserted its power over slavery in the territories
and in new states to be carved out of them when it re-enacted the 1787
Ordinance. 9 In 1802, when the Ohio bill was signed, Thomas Jeffer-
son and Congress affirmed that power once again. Eighteen years later
he claimed that such authority did not belong to the Government of
the United States.
Such a denial of national authority is quite consistent with a prind-
ple long associated with Jefferson's name, but for Madison the theory
of states' rights, which he espoused vigorously in the Virginia Resolu-
tions of 1798 and implicitly throughout the later slavery debates, is
directly and profoundly contrary to the principle of the large com-
mercial republic on which his fame as a political thinker largely rests.
In Federalist 10 he explained the necessity for size in a popularly
governed republic:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct
parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties
and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of
the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals com-
posing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they
are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their
plans of oppression. Extend the sphere and you take in a greater
variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the
rights of other citizens .... so
78. In Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82, 96 (1850), Chief Justice Taney went
out of his way to say that the six articles of the Northwest Ordinance, "said to be
perpetual as a compact, are not made a part of the new Constitution." He cited Pollard
v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). and Permoli v. The First Municipality, 44 US. (3
How.) 588 (1845), but in none of the three cases was this question squarely before the
Court.
79. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8; 1 Stat. 50. See p. 218 supra. In addition to the
amorphous compact theory of the Continental Congress, of courre, the First Congress
had Article IV, Section 3 (the power to make rules and regulations respecting the terri-
tories) and Article I, Section 8 (the commerce power) to rely on.
80. THE Fmnm~sr No. 10, at 60-61 (Nfod. Lib. ed. 1937) (Madison).
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The causes of factions, those impassioned groups that pursue ends
inimical to the common good, cannot be eliminated by any means
consonant with republican principles. But their effects can be con-
trolled. In size, both of population and territory, there is to be found
a wholly republican remedy to the problem of republican, or popular
government; for in a large republic there can be the variety of interests
giving rise to the variety of factions needed to save the country from
the oppressive rule of any one of them.
But size alone, Madison realized, will not necessarily produce the
required diversity. It is "the possession of different degrees and kinds
of property" that produces "a division of the society into different
interests and parties." 8' What is called for is the promotion of these
different kinds of property. And commerce and industry, Madison
believed, breed this diversity of property and interests and help insure
the necessary multiplicity of factions.8 2 As Martin Diamond once said,
"a large Saharan republic would be rent by the Marxist-like class
struggle between date-pickers and oasis-landholders." Thus the rapid
commercialization of the United States is one major premise on
which Madison's famous argument rests. Yet within a very few years
he took his stand with Virginia, whose economy rested on argriculture
and the breeding of slaves to be used in agriculture elsewhere, against
Hamilton, the great and consistent advocate of the large commercial
republic.
The argument of Federalist 10 has another premise, this one more
explicitly stated. To the extent that localities are marked by simple
economies rather than by "variety and complexity" (and this will be
the case if they do not combine and permit the growth of a large mass
market), factions will be able to gain local political control. Thus if
the decisive political decisions are made in the localities where "factious
leaders" are in control, the size and diversity of the whole will be of
no avail. Size and diversity will solve the problem of faction, which is
the problem of popular government, only if the decisive political
decisions are made in the arena where faction does not command-in
the counsels of the national government. That is to say, the solution
to the problem of popular government requires one country with a
government empowered to govern in all matters affecting the country
81. Id. 55.
82. Furthermore, as Madison asserts in Federalist 10, the representatives in Congress
will be abler and more disinterested men; and precisely because of the great number and
variety of interests they will be called upon to reconcile, they will be freer to Ignore
the demands of factions and to follow the rules of justice.
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as a whole-"'anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding." Yet in connection with the Alien Act a
decade later, when his Southern friends saw a threat to slavery s3
Madison reacted by drafting the Virginia Resolutions, proclaiming the
right of the "sovereign states" to exercise decisive political control. In
short, he abandoned the large commercial republic solution and joined
Jefferson, whose passion for the small agricultural republic is one
of the commonplaces of American history.
It is possible, of course, that Madison had changed his mind; that
he had become convinced that a commercial republic would lead to a
vulgarization of humanity-that Rousseau was right in his criticism
of Locke-and that the small, essentially rural, virtuous republic
offered the only solution; that "moral and religious motives" could be
relied on, or would have to be relied on because further reflection had
convinced him of the inadequacy of the alternative. Or he may have
been convinced by the policies of the Federalist administrations of
Washington and Adams that, unless some radical changes were intro-
duced into the constitutional system, there was a genuine danger of a
centralized despotism, and that the most effective safeguard would be
to shift the balance of power between the national government and
that of the states. Such a shift, for such a reason, would only inci-
dentally have the effect of leaving the states with complete authority
to deal with the slavery problem. Whatever his reasons-and to
account for them is a task for some future biographer-Madison
turned his back on the republic that he, as much as any man, had
brought into being. The later Madisonian republic, unlike the original,
was no enemy to slavery, not even to its extension into the western
lands.
Whether Congress, had it adhered to the original intent of Article
I, Section 9, would have exercised its commerce powers to forbid the
migration of slaves within the country after 1808 is, of course, a ques-
tion we cannot answer. The early and almost unanimous embarrass-
ment among Southerners concerning their "peculiar institution" soon
gave way to praise of slavery as an institution beneficial alike to slave-
holder and slave, a shift which was reflected in all national debates
touching the issue and which produced, in time, such judicial decisions
as Dred Scott. One cannot help wondering what the course of American
history might have been if Madison and Jefferson had resolutely and
83. See p. 211 supra.
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publicly maintained their early hopes that Congress could do some-
thing about the evils of slavery and that it would "countenance the
abolition" of the slave trade and adopt regulations forbidding the intro-
duction of slaves "into the new States to be formed out of the Western
Territory."84 Instead they chose to act in the manner that inspired men
such as Calhoun. Similarly one cannot help wondering what the result
might have been had all the states, Northern and Southern, been en-
couraged to approach one another in variety and complexity through
the fostering of commerce in both regions. In The Federalist Madison
had expressed the hope that with the passage of time and with an
increase of commercial intercourse among the peoples of the various
states, there would come a "general assimilation of their manners and
laws."8' 5 But instead of fostering commercial policies which might have
brought about a "general assimilation" characterized by antislavery
"manners and laws," Madison and Jefferson denied the full scope of
Congress's commercial powers, and Madison even vetoed the internal
improvement bill designed to diversify the Southern economy.8 0 In
1819, moreover, in his letter to Robert Walsh, Madison called for a
"diffusion of the slaves" throughout the new states, arguing that this
would facilitate their manumission and improve their "moral & physi.
cal condition." The more likely result, since the slave population was
growing, would have been a "general assimilation of... manners and
laws" quite the opposite of the sort he had originally hoped for. A
civil war was required to prevent that.
84. See note 40 supra.
85. THE FEDERALST No. 53, at 351 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937) (Madison).
86. 2 J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 584-85 (1900). The date
of the veto was March 3, 1817.
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